Relations between the Georgian government and its western allies have recently been anything but smooth. Demands for democratic reforms from the European Union and the USA are increasingly met with attacks and conspiracy theories from Tbilisi.
Tensions were felt everywhere, from repeated demonstrations of mutual dissatisfaction to uncomfortable behavior by Georgian leaders at their high-level meetings with their European counterparts.
With one exception: whenever the word “connectivity” is mentioned, Georgian officials suddenly gain confidence and are happy to offer their allies the transit potential that last year’s geopolitical changes have bestowed on the country.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine found Georgia at the center of the main alternative transit route, connecting East to West while bypassing Russia. But while the new opportunities it brought with it have been embraced in Georgia and elsewhere, there are growing concerns that Tbilisi may seek to use its growing geopolitical importance as a bargaining chip with the West.
“From the outside, it looks like the government is tempted to use this geopolitical factor and sometimes even speaks the language of blackmail with the West,” said Kornely Kakachia, head of the Georgian Political Institute (GIP), one in Tbilisi resident think tank Eurasianet.
The Middle Corridor Project, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, a transit corridor connecting East Asia and Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, has existed for many years and has gained momentum under China’s “Belt and Road” initiative. But the multimodal route, crossing two seas and several countries, was less favored than the more convenient northern overland route through Russia until the war diverted masses of international cargo south.
And as a truck started queuing on the borders of Georgia, the issue ended up on the agenda of high-level international meetings and gradually became a permanent part of Western discourse on Georgia.
The Middle Corridor was created during a recent Senate hearing for Rubin Dunnigan, who was nominated as the next US Ambassador to Tbilisi after being asked about ways to counter Russian influence in Georgia.
“The work we are doing with Georgia in terms of security cooperation and economic cooperation, trying to integrate Georgia with the West through a middle corridor, through energy infrastructure and transport infrastructure, these are all steps that really contribute to Georgia’s future to consolidate with the west. And if that is confirmed, I would continue to make that a priority because I think it’s essential,” said Dunnigan, who did so years of experience in Energy Diplomacy and now serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.
Different voices in there American And European Think tank circles have raised the issue of securing transit routes in their calls for Western governments to focus more on Georgia.
And in the 14 months since Moscow’s war against Ukraine began, the Georgian authorities have seized the opportunity: Tbilisi revived the controversially ended Anaklia deep sea port project, this time to be built with the state as majority shareholder, with a Financial support for private investment to cover the rest. And the government has rushed to complete the construction of the country’s main line East-West Highway and upgrade the rail system to increase capacity to handle more international cargo.
Perhaps the greatest highlight of the effort so far has been the launch of one underwater cable project that would connect the electricity systems of Europe and the South Caucasus and facilitate electricity exports from the region. While Azerbaijan is seen as the top exporter, Tbilisi has spoken out his own ambitions to ramp up and sometimes stoke power generation for potential exports local controversy.
Kakachia sees the project itself as a positive development, but fears that Georgia’s authoritarian-leaning government could use the country’s strengthened new role to bargain with the West.
The Georgian Dream party government “thinks that amid the Ukraine war and the emergence of these corridors, their geopolitical clout is so important that Europe, for example, needs to turn a blind eye to the country’s democratic backsliding,” he said. Kakachia said he believes Tbilisi is encouraged by the example of Azerbaijan, whose lack of democracy hasn’t stopped the EU from cooperating and signing energy contracts with it.
“But the main difference is that Azerbaijan has neither Euro-Atlantic ambitions nor tries to become a member of the European Union,” Kakachia said.
These developments come as Georgia waiting for the decision of the EU on its offer for membership candidate status. This rare opportunity was another important impact of the Ukraine war and the subsequent shift in geopolitical thinking in Europe. But political polarization and democratic challenges coupled with Tbilisi Anti-Western rhetoricare said to have led to them not running on their first try last year.
The outcome later this year will depend on progress made by Georgia on the 12 reform priorities on which Brussels has linked the country’s candidate status. It’s unclear how much its role as a corridor will offset ongoing democratic challenges.
“From an EU perspective, the challenge is to reconcile geopolitics and geoeconomics with values and to form an integral part of the EU’s foreign policy interests,” Sonja Schiffers, head of the South Caucasus office of Germany’s Heinrich Böll Foundation, told Eurasianet. According to Schiffers, the Georgian government is benefiting to some extent from the EU’s geopolitical approach since Russia’s massive invasion of Ukraine.
“One could argue that values should be an integral part of EU geopolitics, but in reality they are not always at the forefront,” Schiffers said.
Georgia has already reported a noticeable increase in cargo turnover and transit traffic last year, but the Middle Corridor is not expected to reach its true potential until transit countries overcome infrastructural challenges. It is hoped that the corridor will facilitate exports of cargo, oil and electricity. Last month Georgian Railways started Deliveries of Toyota, BMW and Audi vehicles to Central Asia. Kazakhstan this year started exporting oil and uranium through the middle corridor. experts predict that if these challenges are properly addressed, the route will retain its relevance even after the end of the war in Ukraine.
Ultimately, it may not be a risk for the Georgian government to over-rely on this role in its external relations. Recent pro-EU protests against proposed laws on foreign agents demonstrated the deep-rooted commitment of the Georgian public to European integration, a trend reflected in the latest opinion polls. Another failure to obtain status can have domestic political costs.
“The West and especially the EU will not only accept Georgia because of its geopolitical weight,” Kakachia said. “Geopolitical weight is important, but without work related to fulfilling the 12 recommendations, democracy, human rights and rule of law issues, the country cannot move forward on the path of European integration.”
