The Georgian Parliament has started debating two bills on “foreign agents”, both of which have been approved by the ruling majority. The bills proposed by former Georgian Dream MPs have drawn significant internal dissent and criticism from Georgia’s western partners.
The ruling party has invested in incessant rhetoric on the issue, making it unlikely that the government will reverse course. Significant elements of the drafts are expected to go into effect in the coming weeks.
The first draft law “On the Transparency of Foreign Influence” aims to ensure transparency and provides for the registration of non-entrepreneurial (non-commercial) legal entities and media companies whose income (more than 20%) is derived from abroad as agents of foreign influence. It has been attacked for its close resemblance to Russia’s Foreign Agents Law, which served to shut down the free press and human rights groups and marked an important milestone on the country’s road to authoritarianism. The legislation was used to “slander and punish independent voices,” according to Human Rights Watch.
As for the second draft law “On Registration of Foreign Agents”, any natural or legal person receiving funds from abroad is obliged to register as a foreign agent. The authors claim that the second draft is an exact copy of the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) against foreign agents, promulgated in 1938 as the US responded to the threat of Nazism and other hostile ideologies.
The authors argue that the draft will allow the state to control malicious foreign influence in the country more efficiently. The opposition, the NGO sector and especially the country’s foreign partners have different opinions. The latter responded in a series of statements. US State Department spokesman Ned Price expressed deep concern about the draft law, arguing that it is incompatible with the aspirations of the Georgian people and their hopes of joining the Euro-Atlantic community. US Ambassador to Georgia Kelly Degnan argued that the proposed laws differ from existing American laws and would damage the country’s relations with the West.
The European Union (EU) followed suit. On February 28, EU Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatović expressed her concerns to the President of the Georgian Parliament. Numerous ambassadors of EU member states in Tbilisi have also expressed concerns about where this could lead Georgia. The United Nations in Georgia has also raised concerns about the future of projects in the country and how the law could undermine Georgian democracy.
The aim of the ruling party is to support the media and ensure transparency about the income and expenditure of non-governmental organizations. However, in Georgia the transparency of media companies’ revenues is already guaranteed by the Law on Broadcasting, and the legality of their spending is controlled by the Financial Authority. In other words, the intended goal was achieved.
Georgia’s Western friends have long worried about the polarization of political life, and the current debate seems to exacerbate that tendency. It seems certain that already radicalized sections of Georgian society will continue to be divided. Terms such as “agent of foreign influence” or “foreign agent” are used as a means of stigmatization. The personal data of those who work in or collaborate with media companies will be made public.
Some also argue that the draft laws run counter to the basic principles of the EU and their adoption would therefore violate Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia, which obliges the constitutional bodies to take all measures in their power to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and Nato .
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While the purpose of the bills is disputed by supporters and opposition, the implications are fairly clear. Passing the law will most likely result in the termination of many foreign grants and foreign donations by NGOs, leading to the closure of programs and the dismissal of Georgian staff. Many NGOs specializing in the reintegration of ethnic minorities into Georgian society and helping people with various disabilities would be closed.
But there is a much bigger problem for Georgia – the law will have far-reaching foreign policy ramifications. The likely passage comes as Georgia seeks to meet 12 EU recommendations to gain candidate status by the end of 2023. The Foreign Agents Act is likely to do such harm that it will hurt the country’s prospects of achieving this historic goal.
If Georgia needs the West, the West needs Georgia. A lot. Europe is seeking strengthened energy ties with Azerbaijan to replace gas supplies cut off by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Several of these routes – including a new subsea power transmission cable to Romania – pass through Georgian territory. In other words, this is an argument nobody needs, except maybe Russia.
This is an extremely sensitive issue. A refusal by the EU to wave to talks with Georgia could spark serious anti-Western sentiment. In fact, there has always been anti-Western sentiment in Georgia, although polls show an exceptionally high number of pro-Western people. Some members of the government were angered when the EU refused its candidate status in 2022, when the country was far ahead of Ukraine and Moldova by many standards. Other grievances against the collective West relate to the trauma of 2008 when it was defeated by Russia. While the conflict was part of the West’s long road to recognizing the aggressive heart of Putin’s Russia, to date it has responded very little to Russia’s invasion and occupation of 20% of Georgian territory.
Georgia has to decide which route to take. Of course, it is unlikely to become a fully pro-Russian state. Those days are over. The Kremlin has lavishly spent its geopolitical capital elsewhere and can no longer exercise exclusive influence over the South Caucasus, and Georgia in particular.
But Russia can and will work tirelessly to minimize Western influence in the region. The delay in Georgia’s trip to the west is a win for Russia, as it has time to restore its power and reassert its interests throughout the region at a later date.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor at the European University and Director of Middle East Studies at the Georgian think tank Geocase.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical issues on the foreign policy agenda in Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or views of the institutions they represent or of the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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